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I. COMPLEXITY AS A SHOCK ABSORBER: THE BELGIAN SOCIAL CUBE
Throughout its history, Belgium has been a complex political and social
entity. The King of the Belgians was told in an official report that 'there are no
Belgians.' The country has rapidly shifted from unitary to federal structure,
with different rationales and responsibilities for Regions and Communities.
Demographic changes are somewhat difficult to map due to restrictions on
questions that can be asked during the census. The combination of multiple
levels of political institutions, group conflict, economic disparities, political
symbolism, and psychological factors demonstrate the utility of the Social
Cubism approach to the study of relatively peaceful conflict.' This paper argues
that much of the complexity of Belgium's political institutions is the result of
attempts to mitigate conflict and postpone significant disagreements.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, St. Bonaventure
University, St. Bonaventure, New York.
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BYRNE, A View From Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN
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An understanding of identity conflicts is incomplete without examination
of strategic interaction and the various facets of conflict. As a result, this
chapter presents a brief discussion of models of strategic interaction,
emphasizing the structural change model. While this model is fairly useful in
indicating the relationship between structures and actions, it is very general. I
thus combine it with the Social Cubism approach to more fully show the
interaction and the interrelation of the different facets of the Social Cube. The
case study of Belgium clearly illustrates the utility of such an approach in
examining an ongoing, shifting conflict.
11. STRATEGIC INTERACTION
Models of strategic action used to explain the constraints that leaders face
provide valuable insights into the dynamic nature of political action. They
present succinctly the interaction of context, goals, actions and outcomes in
complex situations. Drawing from studies of nested games and conflict
processes, I argue that the actions of political leaders are best understood within
a framework that is sensitive to multiple constraints they confront.
Tsebelis has used 'nested games' to model complex decisions made by
political elites. He argued that politicians have relations with other elites and
with their constituents, and that actions with one group will affect the
relationship with the other.2 Similarly, Panebianco indicated that political elites
involve themselves simultaneously in at least two sets of interactions, which
may be characterized as games. In the first set, 'vertical' relations, elites seek
support from their constituents by attempting to represent and enhance
constituents' interests while also helping to shape those interests. In the second
set, 'horizontal' relations, elites vie amongst themselves for power.3 Because
the relations are 'nested', a leader's movement in one game affects her standing
in the other set of relations. Leaders negotiating intergroup (horizontal)
settlements find themselves constrained by vertical (elite-constituent) power
structures.4 In other words, leaders must be confident that their decisions will
play at home. They can use this constraint to their advantage during
negotiations. In general, strong support for a politician in the vertical game
increases her power to influence other leaders in the horizontal game.
Figure 1 depicts two types of games that are often combined in political
negotiations and invoked to explain politics in Belgium. In consociational
politics, elites (represented in the figure by numerals) interact with their
2. GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1990).
3. ANGELO PANEBIANCO, POLITICAL PARTIES: ORGANIZATION AND POWER (M. Silver trans. 1988).
4. ld; Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
(3) INT'L ORG. 427, 427-460; TSEBELIS, supra note 2.
constituents (X with identifying subscript) and with other leaders.
Consociationalism involves elite-level accommodation among separated and
isolated segments, or pillars, of society.5 Originally conceived as a means of
regulating ideological conflict, this theory has been expanded to address ethnic
and cultural cleavages.6 The coalition game involves more complex patterns of
elite interaction, since it entails the need for competing elites (represented by the
numerals) to interact and resolve their differences within a coalition
(represented by numerals within the same ellipse) in order to confront another
coalition. This requires consideration of interaction both within and among
coalitions. Coalitions are essential to -Belgian politics. 7 Combining the two
models provides a more accurate portrayal of the relationships that affect
politicians' decisions, as indicated in the "combined" diagram. This shows
three games: elite-constituents relations; intra-coalition elite relations; and
inter-coalition relations. Because they are nested, each game is affected by
movement in every other relationship. Leaders also compete for constituents
and face factional challenges within their parties, but this figure ignores such
interactions for the sake of simplicity. As the interactions can be viewed as an
iterative game, leaders will pursue strategies that strengthen their overall
position.8 Rudolph's depiction of Belgian constitutional debate exemplifies the
manner in which these games interact: "Each party's [horizontal] move in the
[constitutional] revision process tended to reflect its individual calculation of the
[vertical] electoral advantages of pursuing or opposing the constitutional
reform."9 Many variations could be found on this theme, since horizontal and
vertical relations interact and each action constrains subsequent strategy.
Rudolph also noted that strategies that produce success at an early stage in the
evolution of a party may need to be changed to face new challenges to cohesion
produced by that success.
5. AREND LIPHART, The Power-Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (J.V. Montville, ed. 1991).
6. Sue Halpern, The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy, 9 W. EUR. POL. 181,181-
197 (1996).
7. The coalitions in Belgium are complicated by the joint effects of language and ideology. The
ideological "spiritual families" are officially separated into separate French-speaking and Dutch-Speaking
parties. However, in many constitutional issues, parties will negotiate first within their community to
determine a common strategy with which to confront their partners from the other side of the linguistic border.
Jacques Brassinne, Le Dialgue de Communaut, 4 Communautg: Avril-juillet 1992 [The Dialog of
Communication and Communication: April-July 1992], in COURRIER HEBDOMODAIRE DU CRISP [CRISP
Bulletin] (Centre de Recherch et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Brussels 1992).
8. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
9. JOSEPH R. RUDOLPH, JR., Belgium: Variations on the Theme of Territorial Accomodation, in
ETHNOTERRITORIAL POLITICS, POLICY ANDTHEWESTERN WORLD 99 (J. Joseph R. Rudolph & R.J. Thompson
eds. 1989).
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The size and cohesion of various movements are central to elite
calculations, as they affect the relative power of various leaders to impose their
will on, or to reach acceptable accommodation with, others.1" Appearing to be
challenged by internal factionalization may actually improve a leader's
horizontal bargaining position. It may be possible to use the relationship with
constituents to demand accommodation on important issues. Leaders can state
that internal challenges to their position reduce their room for maneuver and
compromise while increasing their need to produce a settlement favorable to
their constituents. However, they also need to convince other leaders that they
can reasonably deliver the acceptance of the settlement by their constituents if
the negotiation is to be successful."
Burton noted the dangers of these relations when dealing with traditional
ideas about conflict. 2 Conflict is generally considered as competition for
material goods rather than involving underlying social goods that are not scarce,
such as identity, recognition, and participation. Leaders are therefore forced to
accept several important restrictions. Since resources are seen as limited, a gain
for one side is considered a loss for the other. This idea leads elites to seek a
settlement in which gains and losses are apportioned, rather than a resolution in
which all parties fulfill their perceived needs and interests. Further, because
each party seeks a settlement in its favor, each presents as forceful an image as
possible, in order to weaken the opponent's resolve. Of course, both sides know
this and may discount the opponents' apparent resolve.
Given this perception of conflict, all parties then face an "entry problem,"
as leaders dislike entering any institutional framework that compromises their
bargaining positions or attracts intra-party charges of appeasement. As conflict
escalates, parties generally restrict their interaction. Even if parties do enter into
institutional frameworks for a settlement, they must be as forceful as possible
when representing the interests of their constituents. They are also likely to
demand final control of the outcome, using institutions more as a mediator than
a decision-making framework. 3
Once a settlement is reached, elites face a re-entry problem. If leaders gain
a new appreciation for the interests of the other party during the negotiations
and the formulation of a settlement, they may have difficulty reporting to their
10. Similarly, Rudolph states, "[the leadership of] a growing party with a still small electoral
following ... will have comparatively little trouble in maintaining a united front in articulating the party's case
against the traditional leaders of the state. But once the party begins to achieve success at the ballot box, it
must face new sets of challenges and its leaders must deal with new sources of stress." Id. at 105.
11. For an argument of the multiple effects of two-level games in negotiation, see Putnam, supra
note 4.
12. John W. Burton, About Winning, 12(1) INT'L ORG. 71, 71-91 (1985).
13. ld. at 78-80.
own constituents that it was not necessary to beat the other party. Constituents
are often mobilized and groups polarized as the conflict escalates prior to
negotiations leading to settlements. The constituents are likely to continue
viewing the situation in win-lose terms, and consider any recognition and/or
accommodation of the other party's interest as a sign of weakness. Leaders may
face challenges from hard-liners, forcing the rejection of a settlement. Burton
advocates a different approach to conflict management, in which teams from the
parties (including oppositions and hard-liners) meet in facilitated problem-
solving workshops as an option that might reduce the dangers of the re-entry
problem.1"
As conflict develops, elites alter their strategies to adapt to changes in the
combination of these nested relationships. 5 Elster argued that developing
specific rational-choice models of particular situations is even more complex,
because it is possible that what seems irrational or sub-optimal in the short-run
may have repercussions that produce the optimal long-run outcome.16 These
considerations limit the potential of developing a specific calculus of decision
making. The notion of nested games does, however, provide a useful metaphor
for the complex constraints within which leaders act. Leaders are aware of
various contextual factors and usually have developed reasons for their choice
of tactics. The Structural Change Model depicts the dynamic nature of the
relationships described by nested games.
Models of sustained conflict should incorporate likely changes in the
structure of such conflicts. The Structural Change Model, based on the writings
of Burton, Coleman and Schumpeter, 17 includes the notion that conflictual
interaction produces three types of structural change: 1) changes in the
psychological states of participants due to 'residues' of the interaction, 2)
changes in the structure or function of groups due to mobilization, and 3)
alterations of the complex social relations of the parties that further affect the
nature of the larger community. During escalation, psychological states are
marked by increasingly hostile and competitive goals, negative attitudes and
perceptions of the other group and of intergroup interaction. This process can
eventually develop into deindividuation and, at an extreme, dehumanization, in
which participants come to see themselves and others strictly as members of
their group, rather than as individuals. Escalation can produce a greater need
for intra-group cohesiveness, thereby increasing the effect of group norms that
14. Id. at 84-85.
15. Anthony Mughan, Accommodation or Defusion in the Management of Linguistic Conflict in
Belgium, 31 POL. STUD. 434,434-451 (1983).
16. ELSTER, supra note 8.
17. JOHN W. BURTON, PEACE THEORY (1962); JAMES SAMUEL COLEMAN, COMMUNITY CONFLICT
(1957); J. SCHUMPETER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM (1955).
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can lead to polarization and enable more militant factions to gain influence,
which in turn affects the structure and nature of groups. In addition, conflicts
often escalate to include more participants, as each side tries to bolster its
position by mobilizing allies.' 8
Figure 2 presents the Structural Change Model. The model combines the
notion of conflict escalation spirals (represented by the solid arrows) with
confirmatory feedback loops (represented by broken lines). Party and Other
denote the participants in the conflict, with Party being the participant whose
viewpoint is being considered most closely. I follow Rubin et al.'s 9 practice of
placing the perceived divergence of interest in the upper left comer. This
perceived divergence of interest is assumed to start the conflict and lead to
action. As Rubin and his colleagues note, this factor may act on other portions
of the model as well. I have altered their model by refusing to restrict the scope
to heavy tactics, since I believe that the mechanisms also work with light
tactics. 20
The Structural Change Model shows the interrelations between actions and
structures within a conflict. It contains a number of feedback loops, and its
circular nature indicates that conflict should be viewed in terms of iterative
interactions. Structural changes can affect psychological states, the structure
and functions of groups, and/or the nature of the larger community. Arrows [A]
and [C] indicate that the actions of one party in the conflict can produce
structural changes which affect the other party. For example, a sneak attack
would affect the psychological state of the opponent, most likely decreasing
trust and increasing hostility. Arrows [B] and [D] indicate that the choice of
tactics is affected by structural conditions. Increased hostility and decreased
trust might produce more contentious tactics and reduce willingness to bargain.
Arrows [M] and [N] indicate that the choice of tactics may also cause structural
changes that affect the party who chose that action. An action may change the
context if, for example, the party rationalizes a sneak attack by further
dehumanizing the other, or by stating that it was a preemptive strike to prevent
an imminent attack. These rationalizations would reinforce the need to choose
heavy contentious tactics. Alternatively, confidence-building mechanisms may
also be reinforced by this method, as the justification of such methods usually
includes a strengthened perception of the possibility of fruitful negotiation.
Arrows [0] and [P] indicate that structural conditions often produce self-
18. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SSETrLEMENT (2d
ed. 1994).
19. Id.
20. "[Llight tactics [are defined] as those whose consequences for Other are favorable or neutral.
By contrast, heavy tactics impose, or threaten to impose, unfavorable or costly consequences on Other." Id.
at 48.
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reinforcement mechanisms, such as self-fulfilling prophecies or selective
perception.
The Structural Change Model provides a basic model for considering the
potential sources of change in conflicts. It remains quite general about the
various types of change that can occur. In addition to the structural changes
listed by Rubin and his colleagues, parties can also act to change the
institutional framework in which their relations may be conducted. This is
particularly important in conflicts over the constitutional framework of
countries such as Belgium. Those involved in the conflict are aware that
constitutional changes will have multiple and lasting effects on their power.
Their bargaining sessions and negotiations are likely to produce residues that
affect future negotiations. Leaders consider the politics of constitutional reform
as an iterative, learning process.
The explanatory power of the model can be greatly increased through the
incorporation of the perspective of Social Cubism. Structural changes may
occur in the various facets of conflict: history, demographics, religion, political
activity, economics and psychocultural factors. Understanding the underlying
nature of the changes, and their interconnections may provide better solutions
for the regulation of conflict.
I. POLMCAL IDENTITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Ethnoterritorial conflict poses a significant threat to international security
in the post cold war era, sparking civil war in some countries and provoking
significant structural changes in others. Key considerations in the study of
ethnoterritorial conflict are the institutional structures that regulate group
interaction and the demands that group leaders make. A better understanding
of the interaction of these considerations can provide early warning of hot
conflict and help us understand the dynamic nature of the interaction between
identity, culture and politics.
Constitutions provide idealized versions of how interaction among groups
should be regulated. As such, constitutions legitimate various institutions and
social groupings. In multicultural societies, various groups may demand
constitutional changes that affect future interactions among groups.
Constitutional politics is an iterative, feedback-driven process of group
representation, group mobilization, group interaction, and structural changes in
the context.2' We need to employ conceptual models to gain better
understanding of the dynamic processes of conflict. This section analyzes the
interaction between group identifications and constitutional politics in Belgium,
focusing on Wallonia. This analysis indicates that each action by groups can
21. TSEBELIS, supra note 2.
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alter the structure of group interaction, thereby shaping the conflict, and that this
structural change then affects the options available to the groups. It illustrates
the crucial importance of understanding the context in which conflict occurs.
The Fourth Reform (since 1970) of the Belgian Constitution in 1993
marked a complete revision of the fundamental construct of the state. Most
significantly, Belgium officially transformed from a unitary to a federal
government. Some politicians from both major communities advocate further
devolution. The debate will continue with the constitutional revisions on the
agenda for the parliament. The Belgian case poses the question of why its
ethnoterritorial conflict is intense and persistent, but also peaceful and
institutionalized. The application of the structural change model and Social
Cubism illustrates the importance of constitutional debate in the regulation of
ethnoterritorial conflict.
After a review of important steps in relations between the two dominant
ethnic groups in each country, I examine the dynamic relationship between
constitutional politics and the political importance of ethnic identity. In the
discussion that follows, the capital letters in brackets refer to the paths depicted
in the Structural Change Model (see Figure 2) and the lower case letters indicate
the facet of the social cube.22
IV. THE GRADUAL CREATION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
In Belgium, the evolution of ethnoterritorial identities has constrained the
conduct of politics. The gradual shift from strong localized identities to large
ethnoterritorial communities weakened the effectiveness of the unitary state and
the existing provinces. Politicians changed the constitution to create institutions
to address regional and cultural demands better. Francophone Walloon
nationalists, or Wallingants, developed claims largely in response to demands
of the Dutch-speaking Flamingant.23 Walloons are almost evenly divided
between those who primary identification remains Beige and those who identify
themselves as Wallon.24 The current situation in Belgium should be seen within
22. The lower case codes are as follows: c=psychocultural factors; d=demographics; e=economics;
h=history; p=political activity; r=religion.
23. Wallingants seldom refer to themselves as nationalist. They tend to emphasize the importance
of geographic differences. Their label indicates their defensive nature, as it derives from the Flamingant
movement. Flamingants are more likely to use the issues of culture, ethnicity and language. Despite these
differences, both can be referred to as ethnoterritorial movements.
24. Michel Vandekeere et al., Les Declinaisons de I'identite en Waltonie: Couplages et divorces
entre 41ectorats, appartenances et prises de position en matire communautaire et institutionnelle, in IN
ELECTIONS LE FgLURE? ENQUETE SUR LE COMPORTEMENT tLECTORAL DES WALLONS Er DES FRANCOPHONES
(A.-P. Frognier and A.-M. Aish-VanVaerenbergh, eds., 1994).
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the context of the historical development of relations between Flemings and
Walloons.
Although the name "Beige" stems from the Celts who settled the area
around 650 BC, politicians and researchers often assert that a common Belgian
identity is considered artificial.25 Julius Caesar conquered the area in 58-57
BC.26 The arrival of the Franks in early 800s instigated the linguistic division,
as the Gallo-Roman population was settled densely enough to assimilate the
Franks in the south, but not in the north.2 7 For centuries, various city-states,
provinces and empires fought over the territory. No common political or
cultural identity united the people occupying the area. Local identities thus
developed much earlier than, and continue to hinder, the national identity.
In 1792, France occupied the area and enforced centralization and cultural
dominance. With the fall of Napoleon in 1815, the territory was united with the
Low Countries [Cp]. Belgians resented religious differences [P,r] and the
'dutchification' of the administration [P,c]. They declared independence from
the Netherlands in 1830 [A&D,p]. Belgium adopted French as the official
language, although people could choose to speak other languages (Article 23)
[P,p&c]. 28  Suffrage based on strict property requirements assured the
Francophone bourgeoisie of a political majority although most Belgians spoke
dialects of Dutch. At independence, Belgium had no standard form of either
Dutch or French.
Until the mid 1900s, political, economic and social power rested primarily
with the Francophones, even in the northern area now contained in the Flemish
Region.29 Economic development enhanced the power of the southern region
known today as Wallonia [P,e]. Parts of the southern region were early
beneficiaries of the industrial revolution, and developed heavy industries [P,e].
The social and political status of the French language promoted a strong
Francophone presence in Brussels [P,p&d. 30 The Flemish movement, backed
by religious leaders and civil servants, began a cultural campaign to strengthen
Flemish culture and language almost immediately after independence
[N,c&r&p]. Most Belgians, regardless of language, were Catholic, but a debate
over the relationship between church and state increased ethnic tensions [A,r&p,
25. B. BOULANGt AND R. CAVENAILE, LA BELGIQUE DES ORIGINES A L'-TAT FtD8RAL (1990).
26. JOHN FI'IZMAURICE, THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: CRISIS AND COMPROMISE IN A PLURAL SOCIETY
(1983).
27. BOULANGt & CAVENAILE, supra note 25, at 23.
28. The 1993 constitutional reform included a complete revision and renumbering of the articles in
the constitution. For the sake of simplicity, I use the old numbering to refer to all previous changes.
29. RUDOLPH, supra note 9, at 92.
30. Martine de Ridder and Luis Ricardo Fraga, The Brussels Issue in Belgian Politics, 9 W. EUR.
POL. 376, 376-392 (1986).
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C,r&p]. Most Francophones favored secularism, especially with regard to state-
supported education. Many religious leaders regarded the Francophones as
anticlerical, and therefore sought to protect the use of Flemish [B,r&p].3' In
addition, many Dutch-speakers who had been civil servants during Dutch rule
sought to maintain their status by demanding that Flemish be an official
language [B,c&p; D,c&p]. The 1847 Manifesto of the Flemish Movement set
forth several Flemish demands [B&C,p&c]. In 1898, Flemish became an
official language [O,p&c]. This recognition transformed interethnic relations,
as it strengthened the tendency to see Belgium as a bicultural society
[O&P,p&c]. 32 Francophones reacted defensively against the pressure of the
Flemish [C-M]. In 1912, the Congras Wallon advocated an administrative
separation of Flanders and Wallonia [A,p; M,p]. In 1912, future Minister of
State Jules Destr6e, in an often-quoted "open letter to the King" stated, "Sire,
there are no Belgians. There are only Flemish and Walloons," arguing that
eighty years of nation building had failed to produce a dominant basis of
identification, while ethnoterritorial groups had gained salience.33
With the gradual expansion of the franchise, the Flemings eventually
translated their demographic majority into political power [O,p&d; P,p&d]. 34
Universal suffrage for men was granted in 1893, but multiple votes allowed
Francophones to retain a majority of votes [P,d&p; O,d&p].35 This situation
proved untenable, as it signified the domination of the majority by a
demographic minority. Each reform changed the political and cultural climate
to encourage further changes, but also mitigated the levels of hostility that could
have erupted into violent conflict had Francophones refused to increase
Nederlandophone participation in government. Duffy and Frensley' s assertion
that leaders will prefer institutional conflict over hot conflict gains support from
this case in this period.36
31. BOULANGIt & CAVENAILE, supra note 25, at 100.
32. See Raymond Breton, The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources: An Analysis of
the Linguistic and Ethnocultural Fields in Canada, 21(2) CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 123,
123-144 (1984). Breton argues that the symbolic importance of relative status of groups is a key factor in the
legitimacy of a state. Although based on the Canadian case, his argument is relevant here. The increased
status of a political or social minority is likely to produce a defensive reaction in those who see their status
as threatened. This is especially important if demographic factors produce a similar phenomenon.
33. Frank Delmartino, A Regional State or a Federal State in the Making?, in FEDERALISM AND
FEDERATION IN W.E. 38 (M. Burgess ed. 1986).
34. ALEXANDER B. MURPHY, THE REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENTIATION IN
BELGIUM: A STUDY IN CULTURAL-POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (RESEARCH PAPERS 227) (1988).
35. KENNETH DOUGLAS MCRAE, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES:
BELGIUM 35 (1986).
36. Gavan Duffy and Nathalie J. Frensley, Community Conflict Processes: Mobilization and
Demobilization in Northern Ireland, in INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: MAJOR CONFLICTS
The evolution of ethnic relations was interrupted by the First World War.
World War I exacerbated ethnic tensions within the army, as Francophone
officers commanded Flemish troops. The Flemish Frontpartij demanded the
creation of separate military units for Francophones and Nederlandophones
[Cp&c; Np&c]. The Germans used divide and conquer strategies for the
occupation of Belgium, and promoted Flemish nationalism [Cp&c]. In 1916,
they opened a Flemish university in Ghent [Cp&c]. The Proclamation of 22
December 1917 unsuccessfully asserted Flanders' autonomy [C&N, p&c].37
Flemish leaders linked symbols of power and the French language, portraying
the Flemish as victims who could not understand their Francophone oppressors
[C&N, h&c].
During the interwar period, Flemish nationalists demanded complete
linguistic equality [C&N,c&p]. 1919 marked the first election using the one
man, one vote formula [N-O,p; C-P,p]. By 1928, the national administration
was reformed to accommodate Flemish demands for linguistic parity [C&N,
c&p]. 38 The Flemish, noting an increased presence of Francophones in the
north, pressed for the establishment of the territoriality principle as a basis for
language legislation [0-B,d&c&p]. Francophones, however, argued that
language use should be a matter of individual choice [A-D,d&c&p].39
Unilingualism of primary and secondary education was established in 1930,
with Flemish being used in the North and French in the South. The University
of Ghent was converted into a unilingual Flemish institution the same year
[C&N,c&p]. In 1932, the administration adapted to the notion of two unilingual
regions. These steps, though addressing linguistic issues, reinforced the notion
of a biregional and bicultural State. They increased the salience of the linguistic
cleavage by making it correspond to a territorial cleavage [O&P,c&d&p].
The "Royal Question" reinforced these tensions. During World War II,
King Leopold III surrendered despite his government's pressure to form a
government in exile. At the end of the war, the Catholic Party moved to
reinstate the King, but the Socialists led protests. 4° Riots in Liege and Hainaut
ensued [D, p&d&c]. A referendum on the issue produced a majority in the
King's favor, but the regional disparity was striking [M&A,p&d&c]. Flemings
IN THE 1980S (J.W. Lamare, ed., 1991).
37. MURPHY, supra note 34, at 105-6.
38. Robert Senelle, Constitutional Reform in Belgium: From Unitarianism Towards Federalism,
in FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM 55 (M. Forsyth, ed., 1989).
39. For an evaluation of the differences between the principles of territoriality and personality, see
Kenneth D. McRae, The Principle of Territoriality and the Principle of Personality in Multilingual States, 158
LINGUISITICS: INT'L REV 33 (1975)
40. At the time, the Catholic Party was stronger in Flanders, while the Socialist Party was stronger
in Wallonia. Both parties had constituents throughout the country, however.
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voted overwhelmingly for his reinstatement [N&C,p]. A slight majority of
Walloons opposed the plan, although some Walloon provinces produced a slight
majority in favor [A&M,p]. The King abdicated due to the Walloon opposition,
and the throne passed to his son [P&O,p].4"
After the war, Belgians established the Research Center for the National
Solution of Social, Political and Juridical Problems in the Walloon and Flemish
Regions. The Center reported that the Flemish, although the demographic
majority, had minority status in military, political, diplomatic, business and
cultural circles [O,d&e&p&c]. The center noted a gradual spread of French in
Flemish areas around Brussels and along the linguistic border [O,d].42 These
reports provided additional incentives for mobilization along ethnoterritorial
lines [O&P, c&d&p]. The Flemish demanded that the government redress the
discrepancies [C&N,p]. Walloons counter-mobilized against the threat to their
position posed by the Flemish majority [A&M,p].
Political and economic divisions deepened in the immediate post-war
reconstruction. In Flanders, industrialization proceeded rapidly [O,e], while the
old industries in Wallonia steadily declined [P,e] and Wallonia's portion of
Belgium's population diminished [P,d]. In the 1950s, these changes, combined
with further debate over education policy, encouraged the rise of regional
parties [A&M,p; C&N,p]. 3 Volksunie, a Flemish federalist party, was founded
in 1954 [N,p]. 4 Flemish economic and demographic gains [O,d&e] forced the
Belgian government to recognize the parity of French and Dutch, with separate
administrations for the cultural communities [O&P,p&c]. Meanwhile, the
Rassemblement Wallon and the Front Democratique des Francophones formed
to pursue Walloon and Bruxellois regional interests [P,p&c].41
Despite the rise of regional parties, the three main political parties (Liberal,
Catholic, Socialist) maintained their dominance of Belgian politics. The
Flemish Catholic Party held the strongest position, while the Socialists were
most powerful in Wallonia. In the late 1950s, austerity measures and economic
decline in Wallonia threatened to destabilize the government [P,e&p]. In the
winter of 1960 political leaders called a national general strike against the
government's austerity measures, but participation was exceedingly weak in the
Flemish North. Andr6 Renard, a leader of the strikes, founded the Mouvement
populaire wallon to pursue economic and social reform within Wallonia and
41. MCRAE, supra note 35, at 111.
42. BOULANGE & CAVENAILE, supra note 25, at 103.
43. Els Witte, Belgian Federalism: Towards Complexity and Asymmetry, 15(4) W. EUR. POL. 95,
95-117(1992).
44. Murphy, supra note 34, at 201.
45. The Francophones in Brussels and Wallonia are not always united in their political views. The
regional, territorial dimension often interferes with their ability to cooperate.
avoid relying on Flemish cooperation [P,c&p]. This reinforced the notion that
the two main regions sought different social institutions and followed different
political ideologies [O&P,c&p].
The Belgian government permanently fixed the linguistic frontier in 1962
[O&P,p&c]. Before this change, the government had needed to adjust the
boundary occasionally to reflect the changes in language use indicated by the
decennial census [O&P, p&c&d]. Reacting to the dramatic increase of
Francophones in Flanders reported in the first census after World War II
[O&B,c&d], Flamingants claimed that the use of a census question to determine
the border was unfair since it was an indication of the popularity of languages,
rather than their actual use [N&C,p&c].46 The protest forced the government to
remove linguistic questions from the census [C&N,p&c&d], thereby removing
reported language use as a means of determining language policy [O&P,
c&d&p]. 47 The government created a linguistic frontier to bound linguistic
regions territorially. The line was not drawn cleanly; twenty-five communes
were transferred from the Flemish region to Wallonia and twenty-four were
passed in the opposite direction [O&P,p&c]. According to Dustin, the
government initiated the transfer partially due to party strength in the areas
[N&C,p&d; M&A,p&d]. 48 Especially important were six communes that were
transferred from Li~ge (Wallonia) to Limburg (Flanders).49 In a referendum in
these communes, 93% opposed the transfer, but the government refused to
respect the vote [O&P,p&d&c].5 ° The majority of Francophones in Parliament
also opposed this law [A&M,p]. The transfer was a rare example of important
legislation passed despite sharp linguistic divisions [O&P,h&c].5"
Francophones continue to challenge the legitimacy of this law, especially in
Voeren/Fourons where the Return to Liege list has achieved considerable
success in municipal elections [P&D,c&h]. The Flemish Taal Aktie Komitie
(Language Action Committee) and the Vlaamse Militanten Orde (Flemish
Military Order) conducted an intimidation campaign [C&N,p&c] in response
to Francophone Action fouronnaise activism aimed at returning Fourons to
LiEge [A&M,c&p]. Francophone leader Jos6 Happart rejected an offer for help
46. Although some members of both sides did collaborate with the Germans, the Flemish were
portrayed as more enthusiastic collaborators, and were therefore subjected to harsh treatment after the war.
They may thus have been less likely to indicate that they spoke Flemish [O&P,h&c].
47. MCRAE, supra note 35, at 35.
48. Interview with Femand-Daniel Dustin, PSC Archivist (1995).
49. These communes were often collectively referred to as les Fourons in French, and Voeren in
Flemish.
50. MCRAE, supra note 35, at 153.
51. Xavier Mabille, . Le ddbat politique d'avril 1990 sur la sanction et la promulation de la loi,
COURRIER HEBDOMODAIRE DU CRISP [CRISP Bulletin] (Centre de Recherch et d'Information Socio-
Politiques, Brussels 1990).
20021 Carter
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:963
in sustaining a terrorist campaign, perhaps preventing a serious escalation of the
conflict [A&M,h].52
Politicians confronted another problem with the construction of the
linguistic border. They could not ignore that Brussels, located on the Flemish
side of the linguistic boundary, contained about one-fourth of all Francophones
in the country, and had only a small minority of Flemish-speakers [O&P,c&d].
In order to keep this "oil-stain" 3 from spreading, the Flemish pushed for, and
in 1963 attained, the designation of Brussels as bilingual with limited territory
[O-B-N&C, c&p].
By 1969, the Flemish raised another problem. Although the territory of
Brussels had been set, the "oil-stain" of Francophones in Flanders was growing
towards the University of Louvain/Leuven, which is east of Brussels in Flemish
Brabant [O&P,c&d]. Flemish speakers in the university agitated for the
removal of the Francophones from the University [O-B-C&N,p&c&d]. The
splitsing (division) of the university, with the creation of Louvain-la-Neuve,
symbolized the larger divisions within the country
[A&M,c&d&p;C&N,c&d&p]. These changes reduced support for the unitary
state as the notion of a common Belgian identity lost credibility [O&P,c&h].5 4
Structural changes thus accumulated over time, shaping patterns of
behavior and perceptions of the groups. The iterations of the conflict spiral,
with behavioral structures mutually affecting each other, weakened the support
for a common identity and increased demands for ethnoregional autonomy. The
constitution itself would become the political battleground.
V. BELGIAN CONSTrrUTIONAL REFORM
By the end of the 1960s, Belgium required major constitution revision.
The Belgian constitution has been significantly modified four times since 1970.
Each package of constitutional amendments involved institutional reform to
reduce the need for agreement across the linguistic border. Increasingly, leaders
had more independence to make decisions within each linguistic community or
region.55 Belgium has abandoned its unitary structure in favor of a complex
52. Jost HAPPART, AU NOM DE LA LIBERTI [IN THE NAME OF LIBERTY] (1984). Jost HAPART AND
MARIE-PPAULE ESKENAZI, JOSt HAPPART: PORTRAIT DUN REBELLE TRANQUILLE [JoSt HAPPART: PORTRAIT
OF A QUIET REBEL] (1987). JOSt HAPPART AND VINCENT VAGMAN, HAPPART DE A A Z: ENTRETIENS AVEC
VINCENT VAGMAN [HAPPART FROM A TO Z: CONVERSATIONS WITH VINCENT VAGMAN] (1989).
53. Flamingants used this term to symbolize the concentration of Francophones in the Flemish
region. It indicated that Francophones marred the Flemish region, that they were hard to remove, and that they
could spread and cause more damage to the Flemish fabric.
54. Murphy, supra note 34.
55. Unlike most federations, federal laws do not overrule regional or community decrees within their
jurisdiction. There are a few exceptions to this, such as questions of educational policy.
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federation composed of communities and regions, whose boundaries overlap.
This section traces the principal political dimensions of these four changes.56
A. The 1970 Reform
1967-71 produced a major reform of the Belgian constitution. The reform
instituted several structural changes that significantly altered the tactics used by
the parties. Politicians institutionalized the binary nature of Belgium,
establishing the "Cultural Communities" (Article 59bis) Each of the three
communities-the Flemish-speaking, the French-speaking, and the German
speaking communities-received its own Council and powers to enact decrees
concerning cultural affairs and, to a limited extent, education and the use of
language [O&P,p].58 Flemish leaders had led the drive for the establishment of
the Communities [C&N,p&c], but Francophones favored regionalization
[A&M,c&p]. Walloons demanded decentralization of social and economic
matters in order to address their region's economic crisis [D-A&M,c&e&p]. 5 9
The revised constitution recognized three regions, but failed to define
administrative responsibilities for each [O&P,c&p]. Details were postponed, "a
la belge," for future constituent assemblies. Francophones demanded
recognition of Brussels as a region equal to Flanders and Wallonia [A&M,c&p].
Flemish leaders opposed giving Brussels regional status, fearing that such
recognition would lead to a shift from parity to a two-to-one advantage for
Francophones [C&N,c&p]. The compromise was only a partial victory for each
side, since they created regions, but left the status of Brussels ambiguous.
Other important constitutional revisions included mandatory linguistic
parity in the Cabinet, with the exception of the Prime Minister (Article 86bis).
The major governmental portfolios were divided equally between Francophones
and Nederlandophones [O&P,p]. This requirement did not include secretaries
of state (sub-cabinet portfolios), which can be used to reflect the relative
strength of coalition partners and usually favors the Flemish.' Additionally, the
1970 package initiated an "alarm bell" procedure, in which a motion of concern
56. Constitutional amendment in Belgium is conducted within the Belgian Parliament. The
government must produce a list of articles that it wishes to review for amendment. Parliament is then
dissolved, and election of a Constituent Assembly follows. Coalition formation after the election includes
inter-party negotiation over the issues. A two-thirds majority is required for any amendment.
57. Article numbers cited here refer to their original numbering. The 1993 reform included a
complete renumbering of the articles in the constitution.
58. While the German-speaking community was given powers, it has a very small population (less
than 1% of the total population), and does not play a key role in national politics.
59. ANDR9 ALEN ANDRUSEN ERGEC, BRUSSELS: MINISTRY OFFOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTERNAL TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 15 (1993).
60. McRAE, supra note 35, at 185.
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signed by three-fourths of the members of parliament from either language
group could return a bill to the executive for reconsideration [O&P,c&p]. 61 This
procedure can be used in the Belgian parliament (Article 38bis) and Brussels
Council (Article 108ter, section 3). The symbolic nature of the alarm bell
increased confidence that the majority will act with respect for the minority
[O&P,c].
B. The 1980 Reform
Belgian politicians again modified the constitution in 1980 in order to
better adapt the new division of powers. This revision expanded the powers of
the Cultural Communities to include "personalized services" such as protection
of minors and health policy, but reduced their name to "Communities"
[O&P,c&p]. 62  The government again temporarily ignored the question of
Brussels in order to reach an agreement [O-B,p; P-D,p]. Special legislation only
partially clarified the role of the Walloon and Flemish regions, and the future
of the regions remained in question.
The 1980 revision also introduced the Court of Arbitration (Article 107ter)
to settle disputes between Communities, Regions and the National Government
[O&P,p]. Its early decisions increased confidence in the Court's fairness
[O&P,c], and the 1988 reform increased its jurisdiction from only governments
to "any person proving an interest".63
C. The 1988 Reform
The "Happart Affair" is widely credited with causing the crisis that led to
the fall of the government and the election of a constituent assembly in 1987.
Happart was both a Member of the European Parliament and Bourgmestre
(mayor) of Fourons.64 Fourons had been transferred in 1962 from the Walloon
61. MAUREEN COVELL, Belgium, The Variability of Ethnic Relation, in THE POL. OF ETHNIC
CONFLICT REG.: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CONFLICTS 289 (J. McGarry & B. O'Leary eds.
1993); MCRAE, supra note 35, at 183.
62. ALEN, supra note 59, at 15; COVELL, supra note 61, at 290.
63. ALEN, supra note 59, 21-22.
64. Technically, Happart was premier dchevin faisant fonction, i.e.,acting Bourgmestre. The
provincial government of Limburg could prohibit him from being appointed Bourgmestre but not from being
elected as a councilor (dchevin). Article 107 of the Communal law stated that the First Councilor (premier
ichevin) would become acting mayor if the Bourgmestre was unable to fulfill his duties. The Fouronnais thus
elected Happart as premier dchevin, but the office of Bourgmestre was left empty after October 1986 as a
result of a decision by the Flemish chamber of the Council of State. This resulted in the "carousel" in which
the provincial government would disallow the election, but new elections would produce the same results.
This crisis thus indicates the importance of the connections between institutions and conflict. See JOSE
HAPPART, LETrRES QUESTIONS AU MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR MONSIEUR JOSEPH MICHEL [L.ETrERS AND
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province of Li~ge to the Flemish province of Limburg as part of a compromise
that led to the "permanent" delineation of the linguistic boundary
[O&P,c&h&p].65 The transfer was enacted despite a local referendum in which
most Fouronnais opposed the transfer and despite dissenting votes by the
majority of Francophones in Parliament. Happart and his "Happartiste" allies
continued the struggle, claiming that the transfer was illegitimate [A&M,c&p].
They created several organizations to fight what they considered a Flemish plan
to dominate the country [A&M,c&p]. In 1987, the situation in Fourons again
reached a boiling point. Noting legal ambiguities, Happart refused to submit to
the linguistic tests required of mayors in Flanders, thereby producing a legal
contradiction in which Happart was both commanded and forbidden to perform
his mayoral duties [A&M,c&p]. 66 The governor of Limburg postponed
Happart's re-election as Bourgmestre, upon which the local municipal
government dissolved itself to force a new election [B-N&B-C,p]. Happart won
again. A similar case emerged in Brussels. Several rounds of this carousel, as
it was popularly labeled, provoked dissatisfaction on both sides of the linguistic
frontier [A-O,c&p;M-P,c&p]. In 1987-88, political leaders engaged in a new
round of constitutional negotiations.
Debate over this reform shows the complexity of divisions within the
Francophone community and the importance of dynamic models of conflict.
The original controversy over Happart's ability to perform mayoral duties
escalated to the point that the government collapsed and Belgium's political
parties spent about six months negotiating a settlement extending far beyond
Happart's specific plight. The politicians involved all had multiple objectives.
Francophone leaders needed to defend themselves from Happartiste criticism
[P-D,p]. Francophone Social Christian leader G6rard Deprez needed to defend
his actions against accusations that he agreed to the plan simply to change
coalition parties and that he had 'sold out' to the Flemish [M,p]. Within the
Francophone Socialist Party, those who supported Jos6 Happart's regionalist
policies protested that party President Guy Spitaels had missed a unique
opportunity to reestablish Fourons as a part of Liege [M,c&p]. In their eyes,
Spitaels had surrendered to the unending, ever-increasing demands of the
Flemish.67 Spitaels, however, argued that he had chosen the best strategy for
Belgium, leading toward a federal system [A&M,p]. He noted that he had never
QUESTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR JOSEPH MICHAEL] (1987).
65. Although the boundary can be changed by an act of law, such an act would require a special
majority that would include the majority of representatives from both major linguistic groups-an unlikely
event.
66. HAPPART, supra note 64.
67. Interview with Jean-Maurice Dehousse (1995).
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promised that Fourons would return to Liege.6s Many Socialists feared that the
Happartistes would ignore the Socialist platform, or effectively change it to
privilege regional rather than class conflict [P,c&p].
As part of the agreement, the Special Law of 9 August 1988 altered the
regulations for communal elections, consequently preventing Happart from
being re-elected Bourgmestre [M&C-P-D,p]. 69 The government established a
three-phase plan to alter the fundamental structure of the unitary state. The first
phase required the legal recognition of Francophone rights in the Brussels
periphery, the creation of a Brussels-Capital Region with powers equal to the
other two regions and the extension of the Court of Arbitration's jurisdiction
[P&O,p]. The second phase extended the German-speaking Community's
power to pursue international relations (Article 59ter) and included special laws
clarifying the powers of Communities and Regions [O&P,p]. The third phase
established direct elections for Regions and Communities [O&P,p]. The 1988
reform also included a new system of financing the communities and regions
[O&P,p].70 The communities gained virtually complete control over education
(Article 59bis) [O&P,p].
The compromise reached by the parties in this third constitutional reform
neither instituted new and innovative institutions nor completed the process of
federalization. It did, however, further extend the power of the regions, and
recognized Brussels as a region in itself, marking a major turning point in
interethnic relations. As such, it created structural changes that increased the
drive toward federalism.
D. The 1993 Reform
The reforms of 1988-89 left several issues unsettled. In the midst of yet
another crisis in 1991, the executive declared every article of the constitution
subject to revision, and dissolved parliament, thus requiring new elections. The
Christian and Socialist parties formed a new coalition based on an agreement
that was much less precise than that constructed in 1988. The accord cemented
the official federalization of the country, including direct elections for the
governments of the constituent units. This reform involved a complete revision
68. Dider Caudron,. Guy Spitaels:ouitdlafinducarrouselfouronnaismais pas en capitulant, LE
PEUPLE, May 18, 1987; Guy Daloze et al, Guy Spitaels: pas touche 6 la sdcuritJ social, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE,
Jan. 16, 1989, at 4.
69. Happart says this continues to cause him great pain, but he remains active in the PS. As a
Socialist Member of European Parliament, Happart fought for increased regionalization, and now advocates
a biregional status for the Fourons/Voeren. Jose Happart (interview with author, 1995). He remains a
controversial, but popular, Walloon politician. He is currently agricultural minister for Wallonia.
70. ANDRI ALEN AND RUSEN ERGEC, FEDERAL BELGIUM AFTER THE FOURTH STATE REFORM OF
1993 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade and Development Cooperation, Brussles, 1994).
of the constitution, and entrenched both social and political rights. The old
numbering system of the articles was changed. Most significantly, Article 1
now reads, "Belgium is a federal State made up of Communities and Regions"
[O&P,p] Article 138 empowers the French Community to vest its authority in
the Walloon Region and the French linguistic group in Brussels-Capital [P,p].
The Fourth Reform also expanded the international powers of regions and
communities in trade and cultural matters, although their actions must be
compatible with national policies [O&P,p]. The federal government does
maintain the right to require an intergovernmental conference about a proposed
treaty, and if specific criteria are met, the King may suspend a treaty. Most
disputes among governments continue to be addressed by the Court of
Arbitration.
As a result of these changes, three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and
Brussels) and three communities (Flemish, French, and German-speaking)
comprise the State. The German-speaking community is geographically located
within the Walloon region, which is dominated by Francophones. The
Francophone community is located in the Walloon region, except for the
territory occupied by the German-speaking region, plus the Brussels-Capital
Region. The Flemish community is located in the Flemish Region, plus the
Brussels-Capital Region. The new Belgian constitution outlines the
responsibilities of the communities and the regions (Articles 115-140). Regions
have jurisdiction over such issues as the environment, development, housing,
economic policy, energy policy, employment policy, and international
cooperation. Distinct from the regional authority, the community institutions
have competence concerning education and cultural matters such as language
policy, fine arts, cultural heritage, libraries, broadcasting, and youth policy. The
communities also have jurisdiction over personalized matters such as health
policy, and aid to individuals.7
VI. CONCLUSION
Through these structural changes, Belgians have adapted to increasing
demands for devolution. The transformation of the state has been conducted in
stages to address ethnoterritorial concerns, leaving several issues aside until
agreement can be reached. Trust that issues will be addressed later is crucial to
the sense that participants are being treated fairly and to the success of
negotiations.72 Nevertheless, the reforms have reinforced the salience of the
linguistic and regional division and reduced the incentive for cooperation. As
71. Id.
72. Interview with Marc Uyttendael (1995).
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politicians continue to address ethnoterritorial concerns, institutional revision
is a constant possibility.
Due to time and space constraints, I have chosen not to address the
influence of membership in the European Union. However, EU membership
does change some of the political and economic implications of various policy
options. Arguably, the EU would minimize the costs of a break-up of Belgium
into two or three states. However, the status of Brussels still continues to be a
source of contention, since it is predominantly Francophone, but located within
Flemish Brabant. Regional economic differences continue to plague Belgium,
adding to the tension. The Belgians will continue to face significant challenges
as they attempt to regulate ethnoterritorial conflict.
This article has shown the significant interactions among the six facets of
the social cube. Demographics, history, religion, economics, politics and
psychocultural factors all play important roles in the strategies adopted by the
various politicians. Religion emphasized the differences since even though the
entire country is predominantly Catholic, Flemings were seen as more loyal
Catholics. Although history was not frequently used in the coding, the past
history recounted here does strongly constrain the alternatives considered in
contemporary politics. Demographic considerations may change the relative
strength of groups; therefore the government has made the collection of
demographic data concerning language use extremely difficult and will not
allow such questions on official surveys or the census. Immigration, especially
in Brussels may shift political considerations in the near future. Economic
power has shifted over the years from Wallonia to Flanders. In addition,
political institutions have shifted, giving more power to Flemings and
decentralizing decision-making. These considerations are further influenced by
psychocultural factors such as group identification and perceptions of outgroups
and motivations. These factors are compounded by the fact that the
Francophone minority long held political, economic, and social advantages,
leading the Flemings to become a "majority with a minority complex".73 The
increasing complexity of governmental institutions in Belgium is an indication
of various paths that can be taken to regulate conflict, and may act as a shock-
absorber as the general public is forced to rely on the politicians and lawyers to
sort through the implications of further changes.
As we analyze conflicts, it is important to remember that a single approach
is unlikely to completely address the problem. However, various efforts to
reduce a conflict, including symbolic, institutional, and economic measures may
promote de-escalation. These approaches will then create additional structural
change that will influence the choice of the parties' tactics. An increased
73. Interview with John Fitzmaurice (1995).
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understanding of structural change is promoted by sensitivity to the
interconnections of the various sides of the social cube.
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VII. APPENDICES
A. Figure 1: Models of Nested Games
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B. Figure 2: Structural Change Model
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